The Police Service of Northern Ireland has released the Operation Kenova Final Report, with Chief Constable Jon Boutcher issuing a strong call for openness around Troubles-era investigations and the handling of the Army agent known as Stakeknife. The publication, on Tuesday 9 December, sets out findings from inquiries conducted since 2016 and details extensive concerns about disclosure practices and the application of the ‘Neither Confirm Nor Deny’ (NCND) policy.

Chief Constable Jon Boutcher said: “Today we are publishing the Operation Kenova final report outlining the work of the Kenova Team since it was established in June 2016.

“I would like to personally thank the Officer in Overall Command, Sir Iain Livingstone, and the rest of the Kenova Team for the thorough and professional investigation they have conducted.

“I stated in the interim report that the identity of the Army agent Stakeknife would have to be confirmed at some stage and made clear that this would benefit and not harm the public interest. As explained in the final report, the identity of Stakeknife still cannot be confirmed and the full story of his operation still cannot be told, more than 30 years after he stopped providing intelligence.

“This outcome was imposed on Kenova by the Government for no good reason and I know it will be a great disappointment to the families affected and cause them further pain and suffering.

“The report deals with MI5’s late discovery and disclosure to Operation Kenova of a significant quantity of relevant material relating to the handling of Stakeknife. This was provided after the Kenova prosecution decisions had been taken and the interim report published, and long after MI5 had said that all relevant material held had been made available. ”

“The fact this material was provided so late and at a point when further investigation was impossible only caused further upset to the families who have already waited many years to find out what happened to their loved ones.

“I remain concerned that where matters relating to Northern Ireland’s legacy are involved, there continues to be an unhelpful, unnecessary and protectionist approach to the disclosure of official records. This results in wild conspiracy theories and inaccurate reporting.

“During the Troubles, the security forces acted with immense bravery and endured huge sacrifices and this should never be forgotten. I have huge regard for what they endured and the sacrifices so many made with their lives.

“However, post the conflict we must challenge practices that prevent information about Troubles-related cases being released for no good reason. This has a huge and detrimental impact in the confidence of our citizens towards policing and Government. ”

“This final report again outlines the challenges faced in conducting legacy investigations but it also highlights that, no matter how difficult such investigations can be, they must remain victim-focused and keep the needs of the families who have lost loved ones to the fore. ”

“For this reason, I remain very deeply concerned about the lack of legacy funding for PSNI to be able to properly and effectively deal with legacy cases so as to ensure families are provided with the information they deserve. ”

“I am also frustrated by the Government’s failure to support our efforts to address the disproportionate and totemic approach to the way the ‘Neither Confirm Nor Deny’ or NCND policy - on the identification of state agents - is applied to Troubles-related cases, preventing families from receiving information that, both morally and legally, they are entitled to. ”

“The Kenova final report makes a compelling case for reforming the application of NCND. It sets out that absolute secrecy cannot be guaranteed for agents who commit serious crimes and that those who do should not be protected at the expense of justice, accountability and public confidence. ”

“The implications of NCND are profound. Its blanket application and the failure to depart from it in exceptional cases such as Stakeknife: denies victims and families the truth and thereby perpetuates their suffering; fuels conspiracy theories; hinders investigations and prosecutions; undermines trust in policing, the criminal justice process and the state; and allows wrongdoers to escape justice and the security forces to evade accountability.

“As quoted in the report: ‘Security agencies argue that to step away from NCND will put agents’ lives at risk, prevent recruitment and retention of those agents. Yet it is those agencies that in these cases failed to protect agents who risked their lives for the state. That irony should not be lost on anyone’.

“The Kenova investigations found that, in many cases, vital intelligence was withheld from investigators and families, not because of genuine security concerns, but because of a culture of secrecy. “To be clear, my firm view is that the identification of Stakeknife would not put anyone at risk, affect the recruitment or retention of agents or the flow of secret intelligence or damage national security. I believe the Government’s claims to the contrary are untenable and bordering on farce.

“The Government’s refusal to allow Kenova to confirm the identity of Stakeknife serves neither the interests of justice nor the public interest. In moving forward, the following principles should guide the application of NCND and the broader approach to legacy investigations:”

- NCND should be applied only where genuinely necessary, and not as a default or to avoid scrutiny.

- The presumption should be in favour of openness, with secrecy justified only on clear, evidence-based grounds. As public authorities we must be accountable for our actions, including the handling of agents and the investigation of serious crimes.

- The needs and rights of victims and families must be central to all policy decisions and the lessons of the past must inform ongoing reform, to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and public trust is rebuilt.

“In the future, we must ensure that our approach to legacy investigations is guided by the principles of openness, accountability, and respect for the rights of victims and families.

“As the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, I am determined that all information relating to Troubles related cases will be disclosed to the new Legacy Commission established to investigate them regardless of its classification or sensitivity.

“I wish to thank all those who contributed to the report and again especially commend the bravery, resilience and humility of the victims and their families.”

The final report also sets out key factual findings about Stakeknife and his handling. According to the document, Stakeknife was recruited by the Army in the late 1970s and remained active into the 1990s. He met his handlers on average once every seven or eight days, and both RUC Special Branch and MI5 knew his identity from the start, receiving his reporting throughout, including material describing involvement in abductions and interrogations of suspected agents later murdered by the IRA.

The report records that MI5 disclosed further significant material in 2025 covering almost the entirety of his operation, but only after prosecution decisions were made and the interim report had been issued. Over the first 18 months of his agent career, Stakeknife generated at least 377 intelligence reports, with 3,517 in total later recovered by Kenova.

It also states that, between the conclusion of the Stevens Inquiry in the early 2000s and the launch of Operation Kenova in 2016, the Ministry of Defence destroyed original documents relating to Stakeknife, including two files of “contact forms” detailing meetings with handlers. At different times, both RUC Special Branch and MI5 sought to assume responsibility for running Stakeknife from the Army.

The Army set up a dedicated sub-unit, “the Rat Hole”, to manage his handling and intelligence, with MI5 maintaining a permanent presence within it. A bespoke database (known as “Bog Rat 3970” and “Osbourne”) was created to process his reporting, though the report says no trace of that system remains.

A number of his Army handlers later joined MI5, including in senior roles supporting the Director and Coordinator of Intelligence in Northern Ireland. MI5 was involved in tasking through military handlers, received debriefs on all his intelligence, took part in discussions about his role and significance, and provided specialist technical support.

The report describes how handlers flattered the agent and also paid him tens of thousands of pounds, assisted him to purchase a property, discussed methods to mask asset ownership against possible future legal claims, and considered a five or six-figure sum for pension or salary support. For a period in the late 1980s, the Army temporarily halted sharing of his intelligence with the RUC due to concerns it had been used to identify a suspect in the murder of a police officer, potentially jeopardising the agent.

Early resettlement attempts were unsuccessful; he was ultimately resettled in Great Britain in the mid-2000s in a detached house and provided with a car. The report further notes that handlers flew him out of Northern Ireland on two occasions for holidays, using military aircraft, when they knew he was wanted by the RUC for conspiracy to murder and false imprisonment.

Kenova prosecution files, the report says, named Stakeknife as a suspect in more than two dozen offences, including alleged conspiracy to murder, conspiracy to unlawfully imprison, conspiracy to kidnap, false imprisonment, unlawful wounding, grievous bodily harm and unlawful possession of firearms.

The Operation Kenova Final Report can be accessed via the PSNI website.